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Green v. French
143 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 1998)
I Facts
On December 19,1983, Michael Edmondson and Sheila Bland were beaten
to death at Young's Cleaners in Bethel, North Carolina during a robbery.' At
trial, the State's evidence tended to show that appellant, Harvey Green, entered
Young's Cleaners on December 19,1983, armed with a toy gun, intending to rob
2the store. Bland, the clerk, was in the store alone preparing to close for the
night when Green entered. Edmondson's entrance surprised Green, and a
scuffle ensued involving all three persons. Green subdued both Edmondson and
Bland and took some money from behind the counter. Green then demanded
money from Edmondson and Bland, and the scuffle began again. This time
Green used a metal pipe to subdue them, and in so doing, beat them to death.3
Within a matter of weeks, Green confessed to the crimes. He showed the
police the location of the murder weapon, which tested positive for blood and
the victims' hair, and he turned over to police the pair of blood-splattered pants
he wore at the time of the killings.4 On January 16, 1984, the grand jury of Pitt
County, North Carolina returned an indictment of Green on two counts each of
first-degree felony murder and robbery. Green pled guilty on all counts. At the
capital sentencing hearing, held pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000,' the jury
recommended Green be sentenced to death for each murder.6
On direct appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court remanded the case to
the Superior Court of Pitt County for a hearing to determine whether Green's
death sentences were unconstitutionally tainted by racial discrimination in jury
selection in violation of Batson v. Kentucky,7 which had been decided by the United
States Supreme Court subsequent to Green's trial.8 A Batson hearing was held,
1. State v. Green, 443 S.E.2d 14,21 (N.C. 1994).
2. Id
3. Id
4. Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 868 (4th Cir. 1998).
5. N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000 states in pertinent part that "[ulpon conviction or adjudication of
guilt of a defendant of a capital felony, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to
determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. A capital
felony is one which may be punishable by death." N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(a)(1).
6. Gremn, 443 S.E.2d at 21.
7. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that in jury selection, peremptory challenges may not be used
for a racially discriminatory purpose).
8. State v. Green, 358 S.E.2d 60 (N.C. 1987).
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wherein the lower court determined that there had been no racial discrimination
in the selection of Green's jury.9
Unsatisfied with the lower court's implementation of the Batson hearing, the
North Carolina Supreme Court remanded the case to the Superior Court for a
second Batson hearing."0 The lower court made more detailed findings of fact and
concluded again that no Batson error had occurred."
While Green's sentence was being appealed for the third time, the North
Carolina Supreme Court remanded for resentencing in light of the intervening
United States Supreme Court case of McKqy v. North Carolina.2 At Green's
second capital sentencing hearing, the jury again recommended death sentences
for each of the two first-degree felony murders.'3 On Green's fourth appeal, the
North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the death sentences, 4 and the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari.'
Green then unsuccessfully sought to challenge his sentences through North
Carolina's post-conviction relief procedures. After that motion was denied, 6
Green filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on October 3, 1996, before the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. 7 Green
asserted nineteen separate claims for relief, but none were granted by the court.'
Green appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
HI. Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that:
(1) the requirement that habeas petitioners be able to demonstrate inconsistency
with "clearly established Federal law" is not equivalent to the Teague v. Lane9 anti-
retroactivity doctrine; (2) the requirement that such clearly established law stem
from United States Supreme Court did not violate separation of powers princi-
ples or suspension clause; (3) the state court's denial of Green's request for
allocution did not warrant habeas relief; (4) the alleged coercion of the jury at
9. Green, 143 F.3d at 868.
10. State v. Green, 376 S.E.2d 727, 728 (N.C. 1989).
11. Green, 143 F.3d at 868.
12. 494 U.S. 433 (1990) (holding that it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment for a
North Carolina court to instruct a capital sentencing jury that it must unanimously find the
existence of any mitigating circumstances).
13. Green, 143 F.3d at 868.
14. State v. Green, 443 S.E.2d 14 (N.C. 1994).
15. Green v. North Carolina, 513 U.S. 1046 (1994).
16. 473 S.E.2d 621 (N.C. 1996).
17. Green v. French, 978 F. Supp. 242, 247 (1997).
18. Id
19. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding that rules of law which are found to be "new" by a
reviewing court are not to be retroactively applied, absent two narrow exceptions).
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sentencing did not warrant habeas relief; (5) Green was not deprived of effective
assistance of counsel; (6) the trial court's refusal to instruct the sentencing jury
as to certain nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, if erroneous, was harmless
error; (7) Green's Batson claim was procedurally barred; and (8) Green's claim of
racial discrimination in seeking the death penalty by state and county did not
warrant habeas relief.
III. Analyis/Application in Virginia 2o
A. Parsing ofAEDPA
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated as a
preliminary matter that because Green filed his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus on October 3, 1996, the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 199621 ("AEDPA"), amending 28 U.S.C. § 2254,' apply to
Green's petition.' Section 2254(d)(1), as amended by AEDPA, now provides,
in pertinent part, that such a petition:
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claims--(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unrea-
sonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States....'
'Amended section 2254(d)(1) therefore places at least three limitations upon the
availability of federal habeas relief. The petitioner must demonstrate that the
state court's adjudication of his federal claim was (1) contrary to or an unreason-
able application of (2) clearly established federal law (3) as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.' The court then stated that the proper
20. Green asserted that at his second sentencing hearing the judge unconstitutionally coerced
the jury into entering a death sentence by pressuring holdout jurors into voting in favor of the death
penalty. This claim presents an interesting combination of an Allen P. United States, 164 U.S. 492
(1896), "dynamite" jury charge issue and juror unanimity issues raised in McKoy P. North Carolna,
494 U.S. 433 (1990), but will not be discussed here because (1) the claim turns on facts unique to
Green's case, and (2) McKay is particularly pertinent to North Carolina's sentencing scheme, but not
Virginia's.
21. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,110
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). For a detailed discussion of
AEDPA and its effects upon habeas law, seeJeanne-Marie S. Raymond, The Incredible Shrnking Writ:
Habeas Corpus under the Anti-Terroism and Effective Death Penal Act of 1996, CAP. DEF. J. vol. 9, no.
1, p. 52(1996) and MaryE. Eade, The Incredible Shnnking Writ, Part II Habeas Corpus under the Anti-
Terrorism and Effectve Death Penaly Act of 1996, CAP. DEF.J. vol. 9, no. 2, p. 55 (1997).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 contains the federal law as it relates to federal habeas corpus petitions
by prisoners in state custody.
23. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding that the provisions of AEDPA
amending 28 U.S.C. S 2254 only govern habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1998).
25. Green, 143 F.3d at 869.
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constructions of these limitations are matters of first impression in the Fourth
Circuit, and consequently the court set out its construction.
1. '"ontrary to "and 'Unreasonable Application of'
The court held that a state court decision is "contrary to" precedent only
when, either through a decision of pure law or the "application of law to facts
indistinguishable in any material way from those on the basis of which the
precedent was decided, that decision reaches a legal conclusion or a result opposite
to and irreconcilable with that reached in the precedent that addresses the identical
issue. '  In contrast, the court held that a state court decision represents a
"unreasonable application of" precedent only when
that decision applies a precedent in a context different from the one in which
the precedent was decided and one to which extension of the legal principle
of the precedent is not reasonable, when that decision fails to apply the principle
of a precedent in a context where such failure is unreasonable, or when that
decision recognizes the correct principle from the higher court's precedent,
but unreasonab4 applies that principle to the facts before it ....
Summarizing the two standards together, the court stated that habeas relief
is authorized only when the state courts have "decided the question by interpret-
ing or applying the relevant precedent in a manner that reasonable jurists would
all agree is unreasonable." 2 The court cited with approval to the Seventh Circuit
case Lindb v. Murphy,29 which suggested that the purpose of the "unreasonable
application of" clause is, not unlike Teague, to validate reasonable, good-faith state
court interpretations of existing precedents. °
The court's interpretation leaves open the possibility that a federal court
may be forced to uphold a state court decision with which it does not agree,
solely because that state court decision is neither "opposite to and irreconcilable
with," nor an unreasonable application of, applicable Supreme Court precedent.
Because the set of state court decisions which are "opposite to and irreconcilable
with," or an unreasonable application of, applicable Supreme Court precedent is
potentially smaller than the set of state court opinions with which a reviewing
federal court disagrees, the court of appeals' interpretation of 2254(d)(1) makes
it more difficult for habeas petitioners to gain relief. Applied in Virginia, it further
cedes resolution of federal constitutional issues to a state court that virtually
never decides those issues in favor of death-sentenced prisoners.
26. Id at 870 (emphasis added).
27. Id (emphasis added).
28. Id
29. 96 F.3d 856, 870 (7th Cir. 1996), rv'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
30. Green, 143 F.3d at 871.
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2. "Clearly Established Federal Law "
Green asserted that the language of section 2254(d)(1) which provides that
relief may be granted when the state court "adjudication ... was contrary to...
clearly established Federal law," essentially codifies the anti-retroactivity doctrine
of Teague.3" The court conceded that, similar to the effect of the Teague doctrine,
the above-quoted language of the section "imports an anti-retroactivity principle
into federal habeas law by requiring a habeas petitioner to demonstrate that the
state court's resolution of his claim was inconsistent with federal law that was
clearly established at the time his conviction became final."32 However, the court
refused to accept Green's interpretation of section 2254(d)(1), citing three
differences between the section and the Teague doctrine. First, the Teague doctrine
has two exceptions not applicable to section 2254(d)(1): an exception for new
rules which place certain kinds of activity beyond the power of the law to pro-
scribe, and an exception for new rules which are watershed rules of criminal
procedure. 3 Second, the section nowhere employs the "new rule" language of
Teague, even though other provisions of AEDPA do so unmistakably. And,
finally, the anti-retroactivity doctrine of Teagueis applicable in contexts where the
limitations of section 2254(d)(1) are not.' Defense counsel should be aware that
despite the striking similarities between the Teague doctrine and the above-quoted
language from section 2254(d)(1), the Fourth Circuit has held that they are not
equivalent, and thus appears to hold that the exceptions available under Teague
are not available to habeas petitioners.
However, the court did not discuss the possibility that the Teague exceptions
are so narrow, and of such constitutional stature that either (1) state court errors
out of respect to them would always call for federal court relief even under the
relaxed AEDPA standard of review, or (2) congress is without power to prevent
relief.
3. 'Determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"
The court stated that AEDPA limits the source of "clearly established...
law" to that "determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."3 Green
asserted that this limitation unconstitutionally restricts the habeas jurisdiction of
the federal courts in two ways.
First, Green asserted that, to the extent AEDPA limits the source of law
cognizable on habeas petitions to Supreme Court precedent, it violates the
separation of powers by vesting federal courts with jurisdiction to decide disputes
and then "dictating the judiciary's determination of governing law."'36 The court
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added).
32. Green, 143 F.3d at 873.
33. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-12 (1989).
34. Green, 143 F.3d at 873-74.




declined to adopt Green's interpretation, stating instead that section 2254(d)(1)
"does not limit any inferior court's independent interpretive authority to deter-
mine the meaning of federal law in any Article III case or controversy."37 While
admitting that the section does restrict the scope of relief available to the courts,
the court stated that "regulating relief is a far cry from limiting the interpretive
power of the courts," and that "such limitation . . .is entirely ordinary and
unexceptional."3
Second, Green asserted that the section's limitation on cognizable law
violates the Suspension Clause of Article I, which provides that "[t]he Privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."39 The court, however,
stated that the section's limitation does not suspend the privilege of the writ, but
rather represents a "modest congressional alteration of the standards pursuant
to which the writ issues."4 For support, the court cited to the United States
Supreme Court case of Felker v. Tu'pin,4 where the Court rejected a Suspension
Clause challenge to a provision of AEDPA that limited successive habeas peti-
tions.
42
Further, the court looked to the history of the writ of habeas corpus, finding
that at the time the Suspension Clause was written, the writ was much more
limited than it is today. Thus, the court reasoned that AEDPA's "modest con-
striction" on the writ does not violate the Suspension Clause, as it was originally
understood.43
The court appears to create a situation wherein inferior federal courts are
free to interpret the law in a way which calls for relief, but are forbidden in many
of the same cises from granting that relief. It is difficult to understand how this
constriction on the great writ can be described as "modest."
B. Allocution
Green asserted that the trial court denied him due process of law by reject-
ing his request for an allocution. The court defined an allocution as the "'formal-
ity of a court's inquiry of defendant as to whether.., he would like to make a
statement on his behalf and present anyinformationin mitigation of sentence.""'
During Green's second sentencing hearing, he moved the court for an order
allowing him an "allocution at the appropriate time before the jury retires to
37. Green, 143 F.3d at 875.
38. Id (citingLindhv. Murphy,96 F.3d 856,872 7th Cir. 1996), re'donothergromunds, 521 U.S.
(1997)).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I § 9.
40. Green, 143 F.3d at 875.
41. 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
42. Green, 143 F.3d at 875.
43. Id at 876.
44. Id at 877 (quoting BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 76 (6th ed. 1990)).
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deliberate."4 Green wished to read to the jury an approximately ten page state-
ment containing mitigating evidence. The judge denied his request, but allowed
the statement to be placed in the record.
As a preliminary matter, the court of appeals observed that the North
Carolina Supreme Court concluded that, on the facts of Green's case, there is no
constitutional right to allocution. Thereafter, the court of appeals declined to
analyze the question fully on its own, but instead applied the "contrary to, or
involv[ing] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law"
standard to the decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court.4 6
Green cited to three Supreme Court opinions in support of his assertion:
Green v. United States,47 United States v. Behrens,4" and Hillv. United States.49 In Green,
the Court analyzed Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
then required the court to 'afford the defendant an opportunity to make a
statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of
punishment.""'5 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, stated that, "'as a
matter of good judicial administration,' sentencing judges should 'unambiguously
address themselves to the defendant' when complying with the requirements of
Rule 32(a)."'" The court of appeals, arguing that Justice Frankfurter based his
instruction merely upon "good judicial administration" and not constitutional
law, concluded that Green did not "dearly establish" a due process right to allocu-
tion.
The court applied the same line of analysis to Bebrens, finding that the Court
merely interpreted Rule 32(a), and did not "clearly establish" a due process right
to allocution in a state criminal trial.
5 2
In Hill, the Court found that a trial court's failure to inquire of defendant
whether he wished to allocute was in violation of Rule 32(a), but that the error
was not constitutional. 3 Green argued that Hill, being factually distinguishable
from his own case, did not foreclose his claim. The court conceded this point,
but responded that the fact that Green's claim has never been specifically dis-
avowed by the Supreme Court does not establish that the lower court's rejection
of Green's claim was either "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court."54
45. Id (citing Joint Appendix vol. II at 449).
46. Id at 877.
47. 365 U.S. 301 (1961).
48. 375 U.S. 162 (1963).
49. 368 U.S. 424 (1962).
50. Green, 143 F.3d at 878 (quoting Green, 365 U.S. at 303 n.1).
51. Id. (quoting Green, 365 U.S. at 305).
52. Id
53. Hill, 368 U.S. at 428..
54. Green, 143 F.3d at 880.
1998]
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Green's next argument in favor of his allocution claim is more interesting.
Green cited to Asbe v. North Carolina,55 where the Fourth Circuit itself held that
"when a defendant effectively communicates his desire to the trial judge to speak
prior to the imposition of sentence, it is a denial of due process not to grant the
defendant's request."56 Despite the fact that Ashe is directly on point, and issued
by the court itself, the court of appeals offered three justifications for its finding
that the case offers no support to Green's claim.
First, the court cited to the language it interpreted in the first section of the
instant opinion: "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States .... " Simply put, though Ashe is precedent in the
very circuit within which Green is litigating his claim, Ashe is not Supreme Court
precedent, and thus has no bearing on the question of whether the trial court's
adjudication was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly
established Federal law. . .. "57
Second, the court asserted thatAshewas a significant expansion of previous
Supreme Court precedents and thus reasonable jurists could debate the propriety
of that expansion." One wonders if the court would be so self-effacing if a strict
enforcement of Ashe fit its current agenda.
Third, not content to state merely that Ashe, as Fourth Circuit precedent,
did not fulfill section 2254(d)(1)'s requirement of Supreme Court precedent, the
court went on to state that even if the section permitted the court to award
habeas relief based on the inconsistency between Green's trial court decision and
Asbe, the court still would not award the relief, because the state court decision
was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Ashe. In Ashe, the
defendant was sentenced before a judge, whereas Green, as a capital defendant,
had a right to be sentenced before a jury. The court reasoned that capital defen-
dants, because they have a right to take the stand and address the jury at their
sentencing hearings, have a "considerably reduced, if not nonexistent" need for
the right of allocution.
5 9
This idea that capital defendants somehow have a reduced need for vehicles
with which to communicate with the jury is at odds with established Supreme
Court precedent. In Woodon v. North Carolina,' the Supreme Court stated that:
the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprison-
ment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprison-
ment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two.
Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in
55. 586 F.2d 334 (4th Cir. 1978).
56. Id at 336.
57. Green, 143 F.3d at 882.
58. Id
59. Id at 883.
60. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate
punishment in a specific case.61
If indeed death penalty cases require an "enhanced reliability," and there seems
no doubt from the language of Woodson, then it is contrary to Supreme Court
precedent to deny to a capital defendant a vehicle for communicating with the
jury, when that same vehicle is given to noncapital defendants.
Further, a basis of the court's logic is flawed. In stating that the defendant
"is allowed to present evidence as well as take the stand and testify before the
jury that will recommend his sentence,"" the court assumes that all capital
defendants have the right to be sentenced by a jury. In Spazano P. Florida," the
Supreme Court explicitly stated the opposite.' In fact, the statutory schemes of
two states indicate that the capital defendant cannot have a jury decide the sen-
tence. The Arizona capital sentencing statute states that "the judge who presided
at the trial... shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing... for the purpose of
determining the sentence to be imposed."" The Colorado statute states that "a
panel of three judges ... shallconduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine
whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. ... "6
This statutory and case law directly undercuts the reasoning of the court of
appeals.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Green asserted two claims that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment67 and Strickland. Washington.6 The
court of appeals stated that because both of the claims were raised and decided
on the merits in state post-conviction relief proceedings, "our role is simply to
determine whether in either [claim] the state court's refusal to rule in Green's
favor constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme
Court case law."'69 With the court's interpretation of section 2254(d)(1), notice
the procedural trap that denied Green de novo review of his Strickland claim. If
he did not raise the claims at state post-conviction proceedings, they would be
waived. But if he did, then the federal court will not now "freshly" apply Strick-
61. Id at 305. See also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1982) (O'Connor, J,
concurring) (stating that the Court has gone to extraordinay measures to ensure that capital defendants
are afforded process that will guarantee, as much as is humanly possible, that the sentence was not
imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake).
62. Green, 143 F.3d at 883.
63. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
64. Id at 460.
65. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-703(B) (1997) (emphasis added).
66. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 16-11-103(1)(a) (1998) (emphasis added).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
68. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
69. Green, 143 F.3d at 890.
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land to the claims, but rather the stricter "contrary to," or "an unreasonable
application of," standard.
Looking to the specifics of Green's first ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, that his trial counsel "never considered" the diminished capacity defense,
the court concluded that the actions of Green's counsel were neither unreason-
able nor prejudicial to Green, even though evidence was submitted which tended
to establish that his counsel admitted that "he did not fully investigate the
diminished capacity defense."70 Noting that two mental examinations of Green
prior to trial found that he was "of average intelligence and capable of abstract
thinking, without significant impairment of memory, competent to stand trial,
and able to appreciate the distinction between right and wrong,"7' the court
stated that "we cannot conclude that the state court unreasonably applied the
first prong of Stricklandwhen it concluded that Green's guilt-phase counsel acted
within the realm of objectively reasonable professional conduct."
72
In Green's second claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he asserted that
his counsel did not sufficiently investigate the events surrounding one of his
prior violent felony convictions that was used by the State as an aggravating
circumstance. The court summarily concluded that "we cannot say that their
failure to undertake such efforts rendered their conduct constitutionally deficient
under Strickland.,
73
D. Judidal Refusal to Instruct as to Certain Non-Statutory Mitigating Circumstances
Next, Green contended that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the
capital sentencing jury as to certain non-statutory mitigating circumstances. On
direct appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court found that, though it may have
been error to deny Green the instructions, the State had proven that the errors
were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the direct review standard of
Chapman v. California.74 The court of appeals approved of the state supreme
court's finding and stated that "a fortiori, [ ] the trial court's error was harmless
under the less exacting standard for federal habeas review of state court convic-
tions under Brecht v. Abrahamson.
75
70. Id at 891 (quoting J.A. at 167).
71. Id (quotingJ.A. at 211-12).
72. Id
73. Gren, 143 F.3d at 892.
74. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). In 1993, the United States Supreme Court rejected the harmless error
rule of Chapman in collateral attack cases involving constitutional trial error. Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619,637 (1993).
75. 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (holding that where there is constitutional trial error, the




E. Juror Selection Issues
Finally, Green asserted that the prosecutor in his original jury selection
unconstitutionally discriminated against black potential jurors in violation of
Batson v. Kentucky,76 and that the prospect of facing an all-white guilt-phase jury
unconstitutionally coerced Green into pleading guilty. 7  During state post-
conviction review, the claim was ruled procedurally barred. The court of appeals
found that the claim was barred under a state procedural rule that is an adequate
and independent state law ground,78 and therefore that the claims were also
procedurally defaulted for the purposes of federal habeas review.79 The court
further found that Green did not demonstrate the requisite cause and prejudice
or a fundamental miscarriage of justice necessary to excuse procedural default,
nor did he establish entitlement to an evidentiary hearing on this claim under 28
U.S.C. 2254(e)(2).
80
Green also contended that on the basis of statistical and anecdotal evidence,
the State of North Carolina, and Pitt County, North Carolina, generally discrimi-
nate on the basis of race in seeking the death penalty in violation of McClesky v.
Kemp,8' and that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim.82 The court
of appeals found that the claim was ruled procedurally barred during the state
post-conviction review. The court approved of the state supreme court finding
and stated that the then-forthcoming statistical study upon which Green wanted
to rely did "not appear to establish that the state court's adverse adjudication of
this claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of McClesky.83
76. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
77. Green, 143 F.3d at 894.
78. See Ashe v. Styles, 39 F.3d 80 (4th Cir. 1994).
79. Green, 143 F.3d at 894.
80. Twenty-eight U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) states:
(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court
proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the
applicant shows that--
(A) the claim relies on--
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through
the exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would
have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (1998).
81. 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (statingvery exacting standards for entitlement to constitutional relief
based upon statistical evidence of race-of-defendant and race-of-victim effects and rejecting such
a claim based upon the Baldus study).





The Fourth Circuit consistently denied relief or reversed lower courts grants
of relief to death sentenced prisoners before the provisions of AEDPA became
applicable.' The interpretation and application of AEDPA in Green represents
a further, virtually complete, abdication of authority to state courts. In Virginia,
where a state supreme court reversal of a death sentence is indeed a rarity, this
abdication dramatically reduces the likelihood of meaningful appellate review.
Consequently it becomes critical that death sentences be avoided at the trial level.
Craig B. Lane
84. See Arnold v. Evatt, 113 F.3d 1352 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom., Arnold v. Moore,
118 S.Ct 715 (1998); Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 26 (1997);
Pope v. Netherland, 113 F.3d 1364 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Pope v. Pruett, 118 S.Ct. 16
(1997); Smith v. Angelone, 111 F.3d 1126 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 2 (1997); ad infinitum.
[Vol. 11: 1
